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INTRODUCTION
Expert testimony' has been an essential component of medical
malpractice cases,' and has long been recognized as an important
factor in personal injury cases.3 The most common way to present
such testimony has been to use the hypothetical question, which
traditionally required a proper foundation." In cases calling for a
medical expert, the facts necessary for the foundation were often
contained in the medical records of the injured party. These
records, however, were inadmissible hearsay evidence.' Thus, lay-
ing the foundation often required that each nurse, technician and
doctor who had made an entry in the records testify based on per-
sonal knowledge as to the contents of those entries.' Such a pro-
cess was long and tedious, and the subject of much criticism.' The
response to this criticism in the federal courts was to adopt Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 703 and 705,' which eliminated the need for
the hypothetical question with regard to expert testimony.
In an effort to expedite laying the foundation for the hypotheti-
cal question, and to bring expert testimony in line with the more
flexible approach of the federal courts, the Illinois Supreme Court
1. This testimony is by one who has special scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge. Its purpose is to give the trier of fact the necessary background to evaluate the
facts in the case. See E. CLEARY & M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIs EVIDENCE, § 702.1 (3d
ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as E. CLEARY & M. GRAHAM].
2. See Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 85 Ill. App. 3d 32, 36, 406 N.E.2d 544, 548 (1980)
(expert testimony is needed to support a charge of malpractice); Chiero v. Chicago Osteo-
pathic Hosp., 74 Ill. App. 3d 166, 174, 392 N.E.2d 203, 209 (1979) (expert testimony is re-
quired to establish the requisite standard of care).
3. See, e.g., Beloit Foundry v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 III. 2d 535, 539, 343 N.E.2d 504,
506 (1976); Melford v. Gaus and Brown Constr. Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 497, 504, 151 N.E.2d 128,
131 (1958).
4. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
8. Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705 are hereinafter referred to as rules 703 and
705. See infra notes 19 and 28 for the text of rules 703 and 705.
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adopted rules 703 and 705 in Wilson v. Clark.' Although these
rules eliminated the need for the hypothetical question with regard
to expert testimony, they did not change the status of medical
records as hearsay testimony. As a result, use of these records, be-
yond the role they played in the formulation of the expert's opin-
ion, will still require a proper evidentiary foundation.' 0 Wilson v.
Clark, therefore, may not have gone as far as necessary to ease the
burdens of eliciting expert testimony.
This article will first examine the background of expert testi-
mony. After discussing expert testimony and medical records in
the federal system, the article will look at the operation of rules
703 and 705 in Illinois in light of the decision in Wilson. Finally,
the article will consider the ramifications of adopting rules 703 and
705 without instituting a corresponding change in the treatment of
medical records. This discussion will point out the need to make
medical records admissible under the business records exception to
the hearsay rule.
BACKGROUND OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Traditionally, an expert could base an opinion on any one of the
following sources: special scientific or technical knowledge,
firsthand observations, or facts and data presented at trial." It was
essential, however, that the facts forming the foundation of that
opinion be admitted into evidence because the jury' needed the
means to properly evaluate that opinion.' 8 In effect, an expert
could not base an opinion on inadmissible evidence or on facts not
already in evidence.' 4
This traditional rule presented a problem in getting these facts
admitted into evidence. If the expert's opinion was based on per-
sonal knowledge and observation, the expert could testify to those
9. 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981).
10. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
11. See E. CLEARY & M. GRAHAM, supra note 1, at § 703.1.
12. Jury, as hereinafter used, refers to the finder-of-fact.
13. See 2 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE, §§ 672, 676 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as 2 J. WIGMORE]. Wigmore notes that in order for the jury to know whether to accept
the expert's opinion, the foundation for that opinion must be brought out. If the expert
cannot supply that foundation from his or her own observation, a hypothetical question is
necessary.
14. See, e.g., Smith's Transfer Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Ill. 2d 338, 350, 392
N.E.2d 14, 20 (1979); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Eastern Ill. W. Co.,
31 Ill. App. 3d 148, 160, 334 N.E.2d 96, 106 (1975); Pritchett v. Steinker Trucking Co., 108
Ill. App. 2d 371, 376, 247 N.E.2d 923, 926 (1969).
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facts on direct examination. 5 If, however, the expert did not have
personal knowledge of the subject, but instead had relied on other
sources to formulate an opinion, the traditional hypothetical ques-
tion was required."0 The hypothetical question asked the expert to
assume various facts and then to state an opinion based on those
facts. Before the hypothetical question could even be asked, how-
ever, each fact to be assumed had to be proved. Therefore, if an
assumed fact was based on an out-of-court statement, each declar-
ant often had to testify to avoid hearsay problems.1 7 In cases call-
ing for medical expert testimony, this procedure became particu-
larly burdensome. In an effort to alleviate this problem, the federal
system adopted a number of rules which, when combined, facilitate
the use of expert testimony.
Expert Testimony and Medical Records in the Federal System' s
Rules 703 and 705
Under rule 703,19 the three permissible sources for an expert's
15. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 13, at § 675. Wigmore comments that while some courts
have required a hypothetical question, even when the foundation of the expert's opinion is
personal observation, the hypothetical is not necessary in those circumstances. On direct
and on cross-examination, every detail of the observation supporting such an opinion can be
brought out. See also Skalon v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 127 IM. App. 2d 145, 160,
262 N.E.2d 146, 154 (1970) (expert's opinion not couched in a hypothetical question was
admissible based on his own personal knowledge and observations).
16. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). "Hypothetical Question: A combination
of assumed or proved facts and circumstances, stated in such form as to constitute a coher-
ent and specific situation or state of facts, upon which the opinion of an expert is asked."
See also C. McCORmicK, EVIDENCE § 14 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as C. McCoRMICK].
For an example of a hypothetical question, see infra note 77.
17. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to show the truth of the matters as-
serted therein. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at § 246 and at §§ 14-15. For a more complete
discussion of the requirement that each declarant testify, see infra notes 63-66 and accom-
panying text.
18. The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective January 2, 1975 after extensive
studies by a Special Committee on Evidence and its recommendation that the rules were
both advisable and feasible. Rules 703 and 705 deal with the permissible bases of the ex-
pert's opinion and the manner in which those bases are disclosed. They were adopted in an
effort to bring expert testimony in court more into line with the daily practice of experts
themselves and to help ease the burden of the traditional hypothetical. See generally FED.
R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note; FE. R. Evm. 705 advisory committee note; S. REP.
No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
19. Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hear-
ing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in form-
ing opinions and inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admis-
sible in evidence.
590 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 13
opinion include: 1) personal observation, 2) the familiar hypotheti-
cal, and 3) data presented to the expert outside of court.'0 The
third source generally represented a departure from the tradi-
tional, common law bases of an expert's opinion. Critics have
feared that permitting an expert to base an opinion on out-of-court
data would open the door to unreliable testimony. 1 In the area of
medical expert testimony, however, the third source was not a rad-
ical departure from the common law. Prior to the enactment of the
federal rules, physicians had been allowed to base opinions on cer-
tain data presented to them outside of court, such as patient state-
ments and medical records." These sources were considered very
reliable, and therefore received special recognition in the Advisory
Committee's Note on rule 703. Thus, under rule 703, when an ex-
pert wishes to base an opinion on out-of-court data, that data must
meet a reasonably reliable standard;2 it must be of a type reasona-
bly relied upon by other experts in the field.'4 If this test is met,
the testimony is admissible even if the source material is not. 5 Ac-
cording to the Advisory Committee, a physician's reliance on these
sources in making both routine and critical decisions, exemplifies a
reasonably reliable source of opinion under rule 703.26 Further, in
FED. R. EVID. 703.
20. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note.
21. See, e.g., 3 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE 703 [021, (1981) [hereinafter cited as 3 J. WlN-
STEIN]; K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBERG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 229 (2d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBERG].
22. See, e.g., Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 779-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 963 (1965), reh'g denied, 383 U.S. 923 (1966) (even though hospital records at that time
were not admissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1732, an expert could use them as the basis for an
opinion); Stewart v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 137 F.2d 527, 530 (2d Cir. 1943) (it was error to
exclude the physician's testimony based in part on statements by the deceased).
23. See, e.g., Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1980); Bauman v.
Centax Corp., 611 F.2d 1115, 1120 (5th Cir. 1980); FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee
note.
24. In his commentary on rule 703, Weinstein indicated that the kind of data an expert
could use to meet the standard of reasonable reliability would depend on the data available
in the particular field and on the amount of trustworthiness accorded the data in that field.
It cannot be data that only the expert customarily uses; it must be data customarily used in
that area of expertise. Further, he notes that the courts ultimately determine the reliability
question and that this determination can be made before any testimony is given. 3 J. WEIN-
STEIN, supra note 21, at 1 703[01]-703[03]. See also Zenith v. Matsushito, 505 F. Supp.
1313, 1325 (E.D. Penn. 1980) (the courts routinely decide if the expert has reasonably relied
on trustworthy information).
25. See, e.g., Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1980); Bauman v.
Centax Corp., 611 F.2d 1115, 1120 (5th Cir. 1980) (lack of independent grounds of admissi-
bility for the data does not render the expert's testimony inadmissible).
26. The Advisory Committee notes that physicians rely on numerous sources including
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cases decided since the adoption of the rule, these sources have
continued to be recognized as reliable.2 7
Rule 703 did not establish whether, in presenting expert testi-
mony, a proper foundation would be necessary in order to disclose
the facts relied upon, or whether the opinion could be given with-
out such disclosure. Rule 705"8 solved this question by allowing the
expert to state an opinion without prior disclosure. 29 If, however,
the expert based an opinion on reasonably reliable out-of-court
data, and if the expert stated the opinion without prior disclosure
of this data, the jury would not have any foundation by which to
judge the accuracy or credibility of the opinion.80 To remedy this
problem, the drafters of rule 705 provided that the court could re-
quire disclosure of the out-of-court data on cross-examination."1
The cross-examiner would be permitted to question the basis of
the expert's opinion and to use that information to challenge the
expert's testimony.3 2 While there is no absolute requirement of
such disclosure, cross-examination was considered an adequate
safeguard to insure the availability of this information to the
jury."s The same rationale that allows the expert to base an opin-
ion on out-of-court data permits the cross-examiner to draw out
that information. Trustworthy data, reasonably relied upon by ex-
perts in the field, is a competent basis for an opinion whether dis-
reports and opinions from nurses and doctors, hospital records and X-rays, as well as the
patient's statements. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note.
27. See, e.g., O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1089 (2d Cir. 1978) (physi-
cian's testimony based in part on patient's statement as well as hospital records was
admissible).
28. Rule 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons there-
for without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court re-
quires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underly-
ing facts or data on cross-examination.
FED. R. EVID. 705.
29. Id.
30. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 28 for the text of rule 705.
32. See, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 793 (10th Cir. 1980) (cross-exami-
nation can be used to ferret out the underlying facts); Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC
Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1978) (the burden is on the cross-examiner to elicit the
basis of the opinion and to use it to impeach the witness); Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d
259, 271 (8th Cir. 1976) (it was not error to allow the roof expert to give an opinion based on
facts not in evidence because weaknesses in that opinion could be developed on cross-
examination).
33. See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, at § 686 (cross-examination is a sufficient safe-
guard against the fact-finder misunderstanding the expert's opinion).
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closed on direct or cross-examination." The net effect, therefore,
of rules 703 and 705 is to eliminate the need for the hypothetical
question, and to shift to the cross-examiner the burden of bringing
out the factual foundation of the expert's opinion.35
Rule 803(6): An Aid In The Operation Of Rules 703 and 705
The reliability of testimony under rules 703 and 705 in situa-
tions calling for medical experts is further supported by rule 803(6)
which is the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 6 The
critics of rule 703 believed that allowing the expert to base an
opinion on out-of-court data would permit the jury to hear testi-
mony based on hearsay.87 Although the determination as to the re-
liability of the source material is made by the court, and may be
made before the opinion or any underlying facts are disclosed, such
a determination does not change the hearsay characteristic of the
underlying facts." It merely acknowledges that the facts are relia-
ble enough to be the basis of an opinion and that, therefore, the
jury may hear them." Rule 803(6), however, does change the hear-
say characteristic of medical records; it redefines medical records
as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Prior to the adoption of rule 803(6), the admissibility of medical
records under the former business record exception' 0 was uncer-
tain. The basic assumption of the business records exception recog-
nized that records kept in the regular course of a business were
34. See generally FED. R. EVID. 703 and 705 advisory committee notes.
35. See FED. R. EvD. 705 advisory committee note. It was noted that the use of the
hypothetical question is no longer required.
36. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or date
compilation, in any form, of act, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made
at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowl-
edge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was
the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circum-
stances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as
used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occu-
pation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
Fire. R. Evm. 803(6) [hereinafter cited as Rule 803(6)].
37. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 24. See also 3 J. WMNSTIN, supra note 21, at 1 703[02] and 703[031.
39. See 3 J. WEINSTMN, supra note 21, at 705[01].
40. The former business record exception was 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1961).
[Vol. 13592
Wilson v. Clark
trustworthy and accurate. 41 Therefore, they could be admitted to
show the truth of the matters recorded." Medical records were
generally regarded as particularly trustworthy." There was some
question, however, as to whether all entries to the medical records
were made in the regular course of business." In addition, while
business records were traditionally composed of factual items,
medical records frequently contained opinion entries and entries
recording the statements of the patient as noted by medical per-
sonnel. 45 Consequently, some courts refused to admit medical
records as business records.4"
Rule 803(6) establishes that because medical records are kept in
the regular course of business, they are business records and are
therefore admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.4' To clar-
ify the intent to include medical records in rule 803(6), the words
"diagnoses" and "opinions" were specifically described as possible
contents of rule 803(6) records.'8 Further, rule 803(6) defines "bus-
iness" to include not-for-profit organizations thereby dispelling
any doubt that hospitals would not be covered under the rule.'
This special recognition of the trustworthiness of medical records
is in keeping with the Advisory Committee's comment to rule 703
that medical records are a reliable source of expert opinion.60
In sum, under the federal rules, medical records are unquestion-
ably reliable when used as the basis of an expert's opinion. The
burden of disclosing and challenging the basis rests on the cross-
41. See, e.g., FED. R. Evin. 803(6) advisory committee note; Hale, Hospital Records As
Evidence, 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 99, 100 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Hale].
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 703 advisory committee note; Powell, Admissibility of Hospi-
tal Records into Evidence, 21 MD. L. Rzv. 22, 26 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Powell]; Hale,
supra note 41.
44. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 300-01 (D.C. Cir. 1945)
(drawing a distinction between routine hospital entries and entries of diagnoses that may
involve opinion and conjecture). See also discussion of medical records in the federal sys-
tem, infra note 64.
45. See, e.g., K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 21, at 544; Powell, supra note 43.
46. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 1962) (court discusses why
medical records may not be acceptable given the fact that they contain both factual and
opinion information); New York Life Ins. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
47. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee note.
48. Id. See also Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 535 (10th Cir. 1979) (it is not error to
admit hospital records); United States v. Sacket, 598 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1979) (hospital
records are admissible); Rivers v. Union Carbide, 426 F.2d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 1970) (hospital
records are sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible); supra note 43.
49. FED. R. Evm. 803(6) advisory committee note.
50. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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examiner.51 As a result, pre-trial discovery plays a very important
role when expert testimony is involved."2
Discovery of Medical Experts
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) adequately provides for
the discovery of experts.5 3 Under rule 26(b)(4), a party may dis-
cover the identity of those experts who will testify, the subject
matter on which they will testify, and the substance of the facts
and opinions to which they are expected to testify. " The courts in
interpreting rule 26(b)(4) have recognized the importance of dis-
covering both the facts relied on by the expert and his or her opin-
ions, particularly when the expert testimony is to be elicited
through the use of rules 703 and 705." Only through early access
51. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
52. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee note. See also Graham, Discovery of Experts
Under Rules 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Part Two, An Empirical
Study and A Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169 [hereinafter cited as Graham].
53. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee note. For a discussion of the weaknesses of
rule 26(b)(4), see Graham, supra note 52.
54. Rule 26(b)(4) provides:
Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by ex-
perts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule
and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be ob-
tained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify
each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to
state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state
the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may
order further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope
and such provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees
and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). See also Hoover v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 611 F.2d
1132, 1141-42 (5th Cir. 1980); Hockley v. Zent, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 26, 29 (M.D. Penn. 1980) (the
court noted that the proper means of discovering the identity, the subject matter and the
substance is through an interrogatory; further inquiry must be pursuant to a court order).
55. See, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 791-94 (10th Cir. 1980). This was a
personal injury suit involving medical expert testimony offered under rules 703 and 705.
The court stated that discovery is important to insure effective cross-examination and re-
buttal, the narrowing of issues and the elimination of surprise. The court also pointed out
that discovery as to experts does not stop with rule 26(b)(4). Rather, discovery continues
under rule 26(e), which requires supplemental responses to interrogatories regarding addi-
tional experts who will testify and the subject matter and substance of that testimony.
Rule 26(e) provides:
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was
complete when made is under no duty to supplement his response to include in-
formation thereafter acquired, except as follows:--the identity of each person ex-
pected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which he is
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to the identity of the expert and to the data that the expert will
use in forming an opinion can the cross-examiner adequately pre-
pare for trial. Thus, efficient use of rules 703 and 705 involves not
only meeting the standard of reasonable reliability, which has been
eased by rule 803(6), but also engaging in thorough discovery
under rule 26(b)(4) in order to prepare an effective cross-
examination.
The effect of the federal rules is to facilitate presentation of ex-
pert testimony, and at the same time to insure that the basic ele-
ments of fairness and accuracy are not discarded. Illinois has also
attempted to facilitate the manner in which experts may testify.
Certain key elements, however, which are present in the federal
system, are lacking in Illinois.
EXPERT TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL RECORDS IN ILLINOIS
The long, tedious process involved in eliciting expert testimony
has not gone unnoticed in Illinois. Two recent cases, People v.
Ward" and Wilson v. Clark57 , have had a major impact on the
development of the hypothetical question in Illinois.
The Hypothetical Question Before People v. Ward
In medical malpractice and personal injury cases, both treating
and non-treating physicians are frequently called as expert wit-
nesses." It is common in the medical profession, when forming an
opinion and making a diagnosis, to rely on statments made by the
patient concerning his or her pain and symptoms." Illinois recog-
nizes that such statements made to a treating physician are a relia-
ble source of information because they are motivated by a desire
for proper treatment.60 Patients' statements are, therefore, the
subject of an exception to the hearsay rule, and thus, the treating
physician may recount these statements in court on direct exami-
expected to testify, and the substance of his testimony.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
56. 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975).
57. 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981).
58. Treating physicians may be called because of their personal knowledge of the matter;
non-treating physicians may be called because of their recognition as experts in the particu-
lar field.
59. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note.
60. See, e.g., E. CLEARY & M. GRAHAM, supra note 1, at § 803.8. See also McElhaney,
Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MERCER L. REv. 463, 466 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as McElhaney].
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nation." This exception, however, does not extend to such state-
ments made to a non-treating physician who can only testify re-
garding observable, objective conditions."
Physicians, whether treating or non-treating, also rely on infor-
mation contained in the patient's medical records.6" These records,
however, have not been afforded the same recognition given to a
patient's statements. Because medical records contain both factual
data and opinion information in the form of diagnoses, their relia-
bility has been suspect. Therefore, they have been considered inad-
missible hearsay.64 Consequently, the physician could not recount
the information found in those records on direct examination.
Before the expert could state an opinion, the hypothetical question
had to be used in order to present the jury with a factual founda-
tion. 5 Because the records themselves had no independent basis of
admissibility, however, the examiner had to lay a proper founda-
tion before the facts contained in the records could be presented in
the hypothetical question. This meant that each person who had
made an entry in the record had to testify as to his or her personal
knowledge of that entry." The expert could not state an opinion
61. Hearsay is testimony based on out-of-court statements and is generally inadmissible
unless it falls into one of the hearsay exceptions. People v. Carpenter, 28 Ill. 2d 116, 190
N.E.2d 738 (1963). See also E. CLAnY & M. GRAHAM, supra note 1, at § 803.8.
62. See E. CLEARY & M. GRAHAM, supra note 1, at § 803.8. See also infra note 138.
63. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note.
64. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 236 covers the admissibility of business records as an
exception to the hearsay rule. The Committee Comments note that the practice of admit-
ting certain business records was founded in the belief that they would accurately reflect the
character of a business. Testimony by the records' custodian as to their authenticity would
be sufficient to admit them into evidence. Hospital records, however, were excluded from
this rule. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, I 236(b)(1981). The Committee Comments shed little
light on this exception except to indicate that medical records were excluded from coverage
because federal cases were not in agreement on the admissibility of such records. Thus, it
was wise to exclude them from coverage.
Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 359 (4th Cir. 1962), discussed this lack of agreement in
the federal courts. The court noted that the disagreement focused on record entries of diag-
nostic opinions, which were frequently held inadmissible, as opposed to record entries of
routine tests and routine diagnoses, which were frequently held admissible. The former type
of entries were questionable because they were not routine; they required expert interpreta-
tion. The latter type of entries were not questionable because they were done in the regular
course of business and thus carried the presumption of trustworthiness. Illinois, in an effort
to avoid this discrepancy, specifically excluded medical records from the business records
exception. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, 1 236 (Smith-Hurd) (1979).
65. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Western Electric Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 JMl. 139, 146, 181 N.E. 638,
641 (1932); Casey v. Penn, 45 Ill. App. 3d 573, 583, 360 N.E.2d 93, 100 (1977); Slater v.
Missionary Sisters of Sacred Heart, 20 Ill. App. 3d 464, 468, 314 N.E.2d 715, 717 (1974).
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until this lengthy foundation process had been completed.
Thus, with the exceptions of testimony based either on personal
observation, or in the case of the treating physician, on the pa-
tient's statements, expert medical testimony had to be elicited
through a hypothetical question. This time consuming and confus-.
ing procedure has been the subject of much criticism 67 and the
need for improvement has not gone unnoticed in the Illinois
courts.
People v. Ward and The Hypothetical Question
In Ward,68 the Illinois Supreme Court took the first step toward
alleviating the long, tedious process required by the hypothetical
question. The court held that it was not error to allow the State's
treating expert' 9 to state his opinion based in part on the defen-
dant's medical records even though a proper foundation had not
been laid.70 In order to determine whether or not such records were
a permissible basis for an expert's opinion, the court accepted a
test of reasonable reliability, holding that the records used by the
expert must be of a type reasonably relied upon by other experts
in the field.7 1 The court found that because medical records have a
67. See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, at § 686. He claims that the hypothetical question
is often misused, contrived, misleading and confusing to the jury. See also McElhaney,
supra note 60, at 473 (noting that the logistics alone in calling all entrants is difficult); FED.
R. EvID. 705 advisory committee note.
68. 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (1975).
69. The expert may not necessarily have been a treating physician. He examined the
defendant in his capacity as director of the Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit Court of
Cook County. Any lingering question, however, regarding to whom the Ward rule applied
was settled in Wilson v. Clark, 84 Il1. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981) which specifically
extends the rule to treating and non-treating physicians.
70. People v. Ward, 61 111. 2d 559, 567, 338 N.E.2d 171, 176 (1975). This was a criminal
case. The state called the treating psychiatrist as an expert to testify as to the defendant's
sanity. The psychiatrist relied on medical reports compiled by others, including a letter
from another doctor who had examined the defendant and had found him sane. The defen-
dant objected to the use of this letter. The court upheld the admissibility of the expert's
testimony even though it was based on this letter. Two things, however, should be noted:
the doctor who wrote the letter had conducted the examination under the supervision of the
testifying expert, and all of the records, including the letter, were later admitted into evi-
dence at the defendant's urging. Nevertheless, the court noted that even had the records not
been admitted into evidence, the expert could base his opinion on those records.
71. Id. at 567-68, 338 N.E.2d at 176-77. In adopting such a test, the court quoted with
approval that portion of rule 703 which allows an expert to base an opinion on reasonably
reliable facts or data. Further, the court said that restricting the application of such a test to
material commonly used by the medical profession would insure a high degree of reliability.
See also Clemons v. Alton & S.R., 56 I1. App. 3d 328, 338, 370 N.E.2d 679, 686 (1978)
(treating expert's evidence deposition, indicating that he had relied in part on a consulting
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high degree of reliability, the expert's opinion had a valid basis.
Each entrant's testimony, which had previously been a necessary
part of the foundation, was no longer required.7 Consequently, the
Ward decision considerably reduced the time involved in eliciting
.expert testimony. The court, however, did not go so far as to give
medical records an independent basis of admissibility.78 Nor did
the court indicate that the new test could be applied to non-treat-
ing as well as treating physicians. 4 Moreover, the court did not
decide how the facts, which form the basis of the opinion, should
be presented to the jury to allow it to effectively evaluate the ex-
pert's opinion. Wilson v. Clark7 5 attempted to answer these
questions.
Wilson v. Clark
In Wilson76 the plaintiff brought suit for the alleged negligence
of Dr. Clark, which had resulted in the amputation of the plain-
tiff's right leg below the knee. At trial, over the plaintiff's objec-
tion, the defendant placed the plaintiff's hospital records into evi-
dence without laying the customary foundation. The defendant's
expert, a non-treating physician, was then asked to assume that
the facts in those records were true and to assume some additional
facts. The examiner then posed the hypothetical question.
opinion, was admissible). But see Matter of Smilley, 54 Ill. App. 3d 31, 369 N.E.2d 315
(1977) (treating expert's testimony based in part on another doctor's opinion was inadmissi-
ble not because it was unreliable, but because the testifying doctor had no supervisory con-
trol over the other doctor). For comments on this same problem, see supra note 70.
72. People v. Ward, 61 Ill. 2d 559, 567-68, 338 N.E.2d 171, 176-77 (1975).
73. There is no indication in Ward of any such intent. See also Casey v. Penn, 45 Ill.
App. 3d 582, 360 N.E.2d 93, 100 (1977). This case, decided after Ward, required a proper
foundation in order to admit medical records.
74. 61 Ill. 2d at 567-68, 338 N.E.2d at 176-77.
75. 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 192, 417 N.E.2d at 1325. It should be noted that while the examiner used the
following hypothetical question, it did not comply with the requirements of the traditional
hypothetical because none of the facts assumed were properly before the jury. See supra
notes 13-15, and accompanying text. The hypothetical question read as follows:
Q "All right. Doctor, I will ask you to assume that the facts as contained in plain-
tiff's Exhibit 4 and defendant's Exhibits 12, 13, and 14, are true with respect to
the hypothetical patient as described therein by name, John Wilson. That they
are true with respect to a hypothetical doctor who is described therein by name,
David Clark."
"I would ask that you further assume three additional facts. That a surgical
amputation was done to the right lower extremity of the hypothetical patient and
at that time marked arteriosclerosis was found at or about the amputation site,
which is approximately three to four inches below the knee."
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On appeal from a verdict for the defendant, the court considered
the plaintiff's objections to the admissibility of those records. The
plaintiff objected that the defense counsel had not laid a proper
foundation and that consequently, the plaintiff's counsel could not
effectively cross-examine the witness .7  The appellate court re-
versed and remanded, holding that a proper foundation was re-
quired before the hospital records could be admitted and that the
hypothetical question, therefore, should not have been permitted.7
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded.80 It ruled that a proper foundation is necessary
before hospital records can be introduced into evidence. It also
held, however, that such a foundation is not necessary before an
expert, whether a treating or non-treating physician, can give an
opinion based on those records.81 In so doing, the court adopted
Federal Rule of Evidence 703.2 The court stated that the test to
be used to admit evidence under rule 703 is "whether the informa-
"Secondly, found at that time that this hypothetical patient presented himself
in the first occasion to another hypothetical orthopedic surgeon by name of Rob-
bins in the year 1974, the month March, that an opening in the front of the right
tibia was dry and void of discharge."
"Thirdly, I would ask that you assume that it was the opinion of this hypotheti-
cal orthopedic surgeon by name of Robbins in October 1st of 1974, if he were
permitted to freshen up the ends of the bone and place a small screw to hold the
bone in apposition that the condition of ill being then and there present in John
Wilson was going on to healing."
"And I will now ask you to assume all those facts to be true. Would you have an
opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical and surgical certainty as to
whether or not the hypothetical orthopedic surgeon, David Clark, exercised that
degree of skill, applied that degree of knowledge and expertise that a Board Certi-
fied orthopedic surgeon should have applied to a patient in the County of Kane
and State of Illinois in the years 1972 and 1973? Do you have an opinion?"
A "I have."
Q "What is your opinion?"
A "I feel that he did."
Brief for Respondent at 97.
78. See Wilson v. Clark, 80 Ill. App. 3d 194, 197, 399 N.E.2d 651, 653 (1980). The plain-
tiff alleged that his cross-examination had been hampered since the contents of the records
had not been made known and thus he would not know on what facts the expert had relied.
79. Id. at 197, 399 N.E.2d at 653.
80. Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 196, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1327 (1981).
81. Id. at 192, 417 N.E.2d at 1326. The case was remanded because the law at the time
of the trial required a proper foundation and the plaintiff's attorney therefore had no notice
that the defendant's non-treating expert could testify based on matters not in evidence.
People v. Ward, 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171, (1975), involved a treating doctor's opinion,
as did subsequent cases. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. Thus, the Ward
opinion was not notice to the plaintiff as to the permissible type of testimony for non-treat-
ing doctors. See Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 195, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1327 (1981).
82. 84 I11. 2d at 196, 417 N.E.2d at 1327.
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tion upon which the expert bases his opinion is of a type that is
reliable." ' The court then evaluated whether the hospital records
met this test of reasonable reliability. In answer to that question,
the court held that "in the future . . . due to the high degree of
reliability of hospital records, an expert may give his response to a
hypothetical question based on facts contained in those records,
even if the hospital records themselves are not in evidence.""
The Illinois Supreme Court also adopted Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 705, which allows an expert to give an opinion without dis-
closing the facts underlying that opinion.85 Under that rule, these
underlying facts can and should be disclosed on cross-examination
to the extent that they aid the cross-examiner.O" The court consid-
ered whether this procedure would place an undue burden on the
cross-examiner and held that, given the liberal discovery proce-
dures in Illinois, it would not.
87
Wilson, therefore, tried to answer the question left open in the
Ward opinion. The standard of reasonable reliability must be ap-
plied to the data underlying the opinions of non-treating as well as
treating physicians. Further, this underlying data is only revealed
on cross-examination if required by the court or necessary to the
cross-examination. The decision thus reduced the time required to
elicit expert testimony yet allowed for a means of providing the
jury with some foundation to evaluate the testimony.
While the Wilson decision did expedite medical expert testi-
mony, it did not,.give medical records an independent basis of ad-
missibility. Although the court recognized the high degree of relia-
bility of these records,88 it held that a proper foundation would
83. Id. at 193, 417 N.E.2d at 1326.
84. Id. at 194, 417 N.E.2d at 1326 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 196, 417 N.E.2d at 1327.
86. See text of rule 705, supra note 28. Also, as previously noted, the Ward court, see
supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text, did not address the question of cross-examina-
tion of an expert, who had relied on data not admitted in forming an opinion. In Wilson v.
Clark, by adopting rule 705, the court said that it will be permissible to bring out those
facts, whether based on firsthand or secondhand information, on cross-examination. The
burden now falls on the adverse party to bring it out. Further, the Advisory Committee
Notes point out that the cross-examiner is under no compulsion to bring out any facts or
data that may be favorable to the opinion. He may bring out, if he chooses, only those that
are unfavorable. FED. R. EvID. 705, advisory committee note.
87. Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 195, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981). This holding is in keep-
ing with the attitude adopted by the Advisory Committee that liberal discovery sufficiently
balances any extra burden to the cross-examiner. FED. R. EvID. 705 advisory committee
note.
88. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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still be required for their admission."' Consequently, rules 703 and
705 will not operate as efficiently in Illinois as they do in the fed-
eral courts.
Rules 703. and 705 and Discovery in Illinois
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted rules 703 and 705 to accom-
plish the same purpose that the federal system did: to lessen the
substantial time involved in obtaining expert testimony.90 The
court also adopted a standard of reasonable reliability under rule
703 which is the same standard used in the federal system.'1 In
addition, by acknowledging that rule 705 shifts to the adverse
party the burden of disclosing the basis of an expert's opinion dur-
ing cross-examination, the court followed the federal system's ap-
proach to rule 705.' g Moreover, the court acknowledged that, as in
the federal system, liberal pre-trial discovery procedures would off-
set any extra burden that the rule might place on the cross-exam-
iner.9' It appears, therefore, that in Wilson v. Clark, the Illinois
Supreme Court adopted the necessary elements to assure efficient
operation of Rules 703 and 705.
In Illinois, however, medical records themselves are still inad-
missible hearsay. 4 While adequate discovery rules may help the
parties prepare for expert testimony under the new rules, Illinois is
still lacking the extra support which rule 803(6) provides in the
federal system by classifying medical records as business records.
Under chapter 110, paragraph 58(3) of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act and under Supreme Court Rules 201 and 214, information on
which experts rely, such as medical records and the patients' state-
ments, is discoverable." A party may also discover the identity of
89. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
90. 84 Ill. 2d at 194, 417 N.E.2d at 1326.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
92. See supra text accompanying note 86.
93. See supra text accompanying note 87.
94. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
95. Paragraph 58(3) provides: "A party shall not be required to furnish the names or
addresses of his witnesses except that upon motion of any party disclosure of the identity of
expert witnesses shall be made to all parties and the court in sufficient time in advance of
trial so as to insure a fair and equitable preparation of the case by all parties." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, V! 58 (1981).
Rule 201(a) provides:
Discovery Methods. Information is obtainable as provided in these rules
through any of the following discovery methods: depositions upon oral or written
questions, written interrogatories to parties, discovery or inspection of documents
or property, and physical and mental examination of persons. Duplication of dis-
19821
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the experts who will testify at trial and may then depose the ex-
perts. In addition, the medical records themselves are discovera-
ble.96 Although patients' statements and medical records are acces-
sible through discovery, they remain hearsay. Even though the
records and the statements are discoverable, they are not necessa-
rily admissible. As adopted by Illinois and as used by the federal
courts, rules 703 and 705 allow the expert testimony to be heard
despite the hearsay issue.97 The rationale behind this allowance is
that the sources relied upon have a peculiarly trustworthy nature."
In the federal courts, the trustworthy nature of medical records is
bolstered by rule 803(6). In Illinois, however, medical records are
still inadmissible hearsay.
Medical Records as Business Records
Illinois recognizes that records kept in the ordinary course of
covery methods to obtain the same information should be avoided.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, T 201 (1981).
Rule 214 provides:
Any party by written request may direct any other party to produce for inspec-
tion, copying, reproduction, photographing, testing or sampling specified docu-
ments, objects, or tangible things, or to permit access to real estate for the purpose
of making surface or sub-surface inspections or surveys or photographs, or tests or
taking samples, or to disclose information calculated to lead to the discovery of
the whereabouts of any of these items, whenever the nature, contents, or condition
of such documents, objects, tangible things, or real estate is relevant to the subject
matter of the action. The request shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not
be less than 28 days except by agreement or by order of court, and the place and
manner of making the inspection and performing the related acts. One copy of the
request shall be filed with the proof of service on all other parties entitled to no-
tice. A party served with the written request shall (1) comply with the request
within the time specified, or (2) serve upon the party so requesting written objec-
tions on the ground that the request is improper in whole or in part. If written
objections to a part of the request are made, the remainder of the request shall be
complied with. Any objection to the request or the refusal to respond shall be
heard by the court upon prompt notice and motion of the party submitting the
request. If the party claims that the item is not in his possession or control or that
he does not have information calculated to lead to discovery of its whereabouts, he
may be ordered to submit to examination in open court or by deposition regarding
such claim. If requested, the party producing documents shall furnish an affidavit
stating whether the production is complete in accordance with the request.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, 1 214 (1981).
96. See, e.g., Schaeffer v. Sippel, 58 Ill. App. 3d 816, 374 N.E.2d 1092 (1978) (non-disclo-
sure of the expert's identity can led to dismissal); Plost v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hosp.,
62 Ill. App. 3d 248, 378 N.E.2d 1176 (1978) (even during trial, if the identity of the expert is
only then uncovered, a deposition may still be taken); Fure v. Sherman Hosp., 64 Ill. App.
3d 259, 380 N.E.2d 1376 (1978) (hospital and medical records are clearly discoverable).
97. See supra notes 25 & 83 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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business are trustworthy and accurate. Therefore, as in the federal
courts, business records are the subject of an exception to the hear-
say rule.99 Medical records, although kept in the ordinary course of
business as part of the regular hospital routine, are specifically ex-
cluded from this exception.100
The rationale for excluding medical records from the business
record exception was based on the federal courts' previous disa-
greement over their treatment.10 1 Rule 803(6), however, settled
that disagreement and specifically included medical records in the
business records exception.10 2 The drafters of federal rule 803(6)
recognized that medical records were particularly trustworthy, and
included the words "diagnoses" and "opinions" within the rule to
clarify the intent to include medical records.103 Because the federal
rules are no longer unsettled, the original reason for excluding
medical records from the Illinois business records exception to the
hearsay rule is no longer valid.
In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Ward and in Wilson,
identified medical records as a particularly good example of what
rule 703 means by a reasonably reliable source of an expert's opin-
ion.' " As such, the facts and opinions contained in the records are
admissible for the limited purpose of establishing the factual foun-
dation of the expert's opinion so that the jury may evaluate it.10 5
This leads to the anomalous result that a source of information
widely recognized as highly reliable is only indirectly allowed into
the proceedings. Moreover, should the examiner want to introduce
any of the facts and opinions contained in the records, it will be
necessary for the entrants to testify.'" This requirement rein-
troduces the foundation process previously required with the hypo-
thetical question, and thus defeats the federal rules' aim of brevity.
If, however, medical records were included in the Illinois business
records exception, as they are in the federal rules, this problem
would not arise.107
99. See supra note 64.
100. Id.
101. Id. See also supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 72 & 84 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 66 & 89 and accompanying text.
107. If the medical records were included in the business records exception, the only
testimony necessary would be that of an authenticating witness. See also supra note 64.
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In addition, classifying medical records as inadmissible hearsay
may create problems for the cross-examiner. There has been some
confusion in the federal courts regarding the scope of cross-exami-
nation when the data underlying the opinion is inadmissible hear-
say. This confusion does not arise, however, if the underlying data
is admissible hearsay.1o8
Possible Limits on Cross-Examination Under Rule 705
In Bryan v. John Bean Division of FMC Corp.10 9 the plaintiff,
on cross-examination of the expert, made maximum use of two re-
ports that the witness had used in reaching his opinion. 10 Those
reports contained certain data as well as opinions of two other ex-
perts. The Fifth Circuit held that it was permissible to bring out
the statistical information on cross-examination because the wit-
ness had used those statistics in forming his own opinion."' The
witness, however, had not relied on the two experts' opinions found
in those reports. Therefore, the court held that even though those
opinions differed from that of the witness, it was not permissible to
bring them out on cross-examination even to impeach the
witness.""
The court disallowed the use of the report to impeach the expert
witness because the opinions were hearsay and thus were not suffi-
ciently trustworthy to warrant disclosure." s  It must be
remembered, however, that hearsay is an out-of-court statement
offered for its truth." 4 In this case, the opinions of the other ex-
perts were not offered for their truth but rather to disclose that the
testifying expert had knowledge of contrary opinions contained
within the very reports he had used to form his own opinion.1 5
Although the court acknowledged that hearsay evidence should be
admissible to impeach if strictly limited to that purpose, and if
accompanied by an appropriate limiting instruction,"' the court
held that the other opinions within the reports were not indepen-
108. See infra notes 109-31 and accompanying text.
109. 566 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978).
110. Id. at 544.
111. Id. at 546.
112. Id. at 544-47.
113. Id. at 546. Because those reports were compiled out-of-court, their contents re-
present out-of-court statements and as such they were inadmissible hearsay.
114. C. MCCORMICK, supra, note 16, at § 246.
115. Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1978).
116. Id: at 545. It should also be noted that a limiting instruction regarding the use of
the evidence was given at trial. Id. at 547 n.6.
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dently trustworthy. Therefore, those opinions were not subject to
disclosure under rule 705 or for impeachment. 1 " Proper use of
these opinions as impeachment evidence would require calling as
witnesses the authors of those opinions."" Thus, under the Bryan
interpretation, if other opinions or facts would tend to impeach the
expert, but the expert had not relied on those opinions or facts,
they could not be raised during cross-examination. This rule would
apply even if the court recognized the report containing these facts
and opinions as a reasonably reliable basis for the opinion.1""
Such a ruling contradicts the traditional view of impeachment.
Impeachment involves discrediting the witness' credibility and not
presenting substantive evidence. 20 Thus, the traditional view held
that hearsay evidence could be used during cross-examination to
discredit the witness provided that it was limited to that purpose
and that the jury was carefully instructed about that limit."' The
Bryan court recognized the traditional view as still valid, but re-
quired that the impeaching evidence meet a test of trustworthiness
before it could be used to impeach.' 2 '
Actually, the additional requirement of trustworthiness should
have been unnecessary. The reports containing the other opinions
had already met the standard of reasonable reliability iii order to
be accepted as a valid basis for the expert's opinion."23 In addition,
the Bryan rule contravened the basic concepts of fairness by not
allowing the cross-examiner to show that the reports on which the
expert relied also contained other information, and that, therefore,
the expert's reliance may have been selective."' As noted above,
the use of these facts and opinions by the cross-examiner would
not be to show their truth, but rather to discredit the expert's
credibility.
Regardless of Bryan's inconsistency, the Fifth Circuit has again
followed that approach. In Bobb v. Modern Products, Inc.,1' 6 the
court held it improper for the cross-examiner to impeach the ex-
117. Id. at 547.
118. Id.
119. Under rule 703, the expert's opinion must be based on reasonably reliable informa-
tion. Here the statistical information within the reports was considered reliable.
120. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at § 33.
121. See, e.g., Baltimore & O.R. v. O'Neill, 211 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1954).
122. Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1978).
123. See supra note 119.
124. See, e.g., Karl v. Employer's Ins. of Wausau, 78 Wis. 2d 284, 254 N.W.2d 255, 262
(1977); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at § 14.
125. 648 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1981).
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pert by using facts in a hearsay report."2 6 The witness had seen the
deposition of another physician prior to trial. The testifying ex-
pert, however, did not indicate that he had relied on the report
contained in the physician's deposition. While his lack of reliance
would have been a proper reason to disallow the disclosure under
rule 705,17 the court did not exclude the report because of the ex-
pert's lack of reliance but rather because of its hearsay nature.1 2 8
Bobb held that such hearsay reports were not admissible, even as
impeachment evidence, unless the expert had based his opinion on
the opinions within the reports, or had testified directly from the
reports.1 29 Thus, if courts continue to follow the Bryan and Bobb
reasoning, cross-examiners may not be able to impeach experts
with additional facts and opinions found within the same hearsay
reports relied on by the experts.
In contrast to the Illinois approach, the Bryan limitation, as ap-
plied to medical expert testimony based on medical records, is
eliminated in the federal system by rule 803(6). By including medi-
cal records in the business records exception to the hearsay rule,
the drafters recognized the trustworthiness of medical records. 80
Therefore, if the expert had relied on only part of the record in
reaching an opinion, there could be no objection on the grounds of
unreliability to further use of the complete record to impeach.
Moreover, because the records are admissible under rule 803(6),
the cross-examiner may later establish the impeachment evidence
without having to call every person who made entries to the
record.'
The Future of the Bryan Rule in Illinois
It is not yet clear whether the Illinois Supreme Court will follow
Bryan. In the recent case of People v. Pitts,'3 2 the Illinois appel-
126. Id. at 1055.
127. Rule 705 allows disclosure of the reports relied on by the expert in formulating his
opinion. If, as here, there was no reliance, disclosure could not be required on that basis.
But see infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text regarding a ruling that allowed cross-
examination using reports upon which the expert did not explicitly rely because they were
of a type of report reasonably relied on.
128. 648 F.2d at 1055.
129. Id. at 1056.
130. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. In addition, even the Bryan court recog-
nized that medical reports would probably not be subject to the Bryan limitation because of
their established reliability.
131. See supra notes 16-17 and 47-48 and accompanying text.
132. No. 80-1489, slip-op. (4th Div. Ill. Feb. 11, 1982).
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late court allowed the cross-examiner to impeach the expert's testi-
mony by using reports of other doctors, upon which the testifying
expert had not relied or even read.183 According to the court, the
key element under rules 703 and 705 is whether the information is
of a type considered reliable."3 4 Because the reports of the other
doctors were considered reliable, the contents of those reports
could be raised on cross-examination even if the testifying expert
had neither depended on them nor read them. Under the Pitts in-
terpretation, the exclusion of medical records from the business
records exception would have no bearing on their use for impeach-
ment because they are considered reliable. 35 Nevertheless, further
use of the records would still require the tedious process of calling
each entrant to testify.13 Moreover, should the Illinois Supreme
Court decide to follow the Bryan approach, the records could only
be used to impeach the expert witness to the extent that he or she
had actually relied upon them. 1, 7 Should Illinois, however, follow
the federal system by including medical records within the busi-
ness records exception to the hearsay rule, the Bryan limitation, as
well as the time consuming process required to introduce the
records into evidence, could be eliminated.
CONCLUSION
The steps taken by the supreme court in Wilson v. Clark
brought Illinois into line with the modern approach to expert testi-
mony. The Illinois business records exception to the hearsay rule,
however, which does not apply to medical records, reduces the im-
pact of that decision. Rules 703 and 705 are designed to achieve
brevity in the presentation of expert testimony while maintaining
fairness and accuracy. The rules focus on the requirement that the
basis of the expert's opinion meet a standard of reasonable reliabil-
ity. Medical records meet this standard, and including them in the
business records exception would strengthen their competency as a
reliable basis for an opinion. In addition, if the records are not in-
cluded in the exception, and if the examiner is required to engage
in long, testimonial proof regarding the basis of an expert's opin-
ion, the overall time involved will not be substantially reduced.
133. Id. at 11-13.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Once the report meets the standard of reasonable reliability, it could be used as the
basis of the opinion as well as for impeachment.
136. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the possible limitations on cross-examination may apply
due to the hearsay character of medical records. To alleviate these
problems and further facilitate expert testimony in Illinois, medi-
cal records should be included in the business records exception to
the hearsay rule.138
IRENE M. SHERIDAN
138. The adoption of rules 703 and 705 poses some additional questions. As already
noted, statements made by a patient to the treating physician are admissible as an excep-
tion to the Illinois hearsay rule. See supra note 60. Similar statements made to a non-
treating physician, however, are not admissible. Under rule 703 an expert may base his opin-
ion on reasonably reliable information. In the federal system, rule 803(4) acknowledges that
whether such statements are made to a treating or non-treating physician they are admissi-
ble as an exception to the hearsay rule. Thus relying on them and disclosing them under
rules 703 and 705 poses no problem in the federal system. For a full discussion of this ques-
tion as it may apply in Illinois, see Theis, The Doctor as Witness: Statements for Purposes
of Medical Diagnoses or Treatment, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 363 (1979). In addition, the admis-
sion of records under the business records exception required authentication by the record
custodian. See supra note 64. In Wilson v. Clark, the parties stipulated to the authenticity
of the records. Consequently, when the court reviewed the case they did not answer whether
it would be necessary or not to authenticate the records in the future if only used as the
foundation for the expert's opinion.
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